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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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Project 11, is the first international exchange program of its kind.

It will be sponsored by the Joseph Bulova School of Watchmaking in cooperation with the World Rehabilitation Fund, International Society for Rehabilitation of the Disabled and Adelphi College, Garden City, Long Island.

Training will be given at the Bulova school, founded by the late Arde Bulova immediately following World War II. The school, which has graduated more than 700 disabled veterans and civilians, is named for Mr. Bulova's father.

General Bradley said initially scholarships will be provided for disabled trainees from Hong Kong, Italy, North Africa, and Australia. Later the program will be extended to other nations. Two students have already arrived from Israel.

The 2-year Arde Bulova Memorial Scholarships to be given the international trainees provide for tuition, room and board, and medical services valued at about \$7,500 a student.

eign policy, scientific advancement, and military planning.

Politically, the President had to recognize the deep emotional biases on both sides of the issue inside the United States. There were those who would have us test, whatever the effects of such tests on health, national and world opinion, or long-term disarmament goals. There were those who would oppose all tests, whatever the effects of such a decision on our defensive capacity and the balance of power. There was a large group without opinions, but with vague and disquieting fears over what might happen if we should resume tests.

As the leader of the free world, the President had to take into account the attitude of our allies and friends and the reaction of the uncommitted nations. We could not have our policies determined by them, but neither, in the contest for men's minds, could we afford to ignore their opinions.

I do not need to detail the scientific and military requirements which enforced the need to resume the tests. This is an age when military technology holds the key to the balance of power, when the scientific advances of today forecast the potential strength of tomorrow, and when the force of weapons threatens broad-scale devastation.

Until we have found the political and scientific means of controlling the development, possession, and use of weapons, we cannot avoid our responsibility for maintaining and expanding our defensive and offensive capacity. Our Secretary of State is, this week, testing whether or not such control is possible.

All of this implies a deep and lasting struggle; one in which the free nations and the Communist bloc are deeply involved, and one from which the uncommitted nations are trying desperately to escape. There is no visible end to the struggle. Although it resembles war in so many ways, the cold war does not offer the immediate and decisive choices which make war palatable to some and bearable to others. In the cold war there is the constant threat of intellectual frostbite, frozen attitudes, and apathy. A cold shower braces; but the penetrating cold of a long winter's night threatens to drain the resources of the hardest among us.

How, in such a protracted struggle does a free society retain its vitality, provide for its defense, and give leadership against an implacable and resourceful foe?

Or, as Senator Jackson put it in his final statement for the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery: "Can free societies outplan, outperform, outlast—and if need be, outsurvive—totalitarian systems? Can we recognize fresh problems in a changing world and respond in time with new plans for meeting them?"

In this forum, you are wrestling with the problems of coordinated planning. As manufacturers of electronic devices, you have banded together, in part, "to advance the defense of our country, the growth of our economy, the progress of technology, and all interests of the electronics industry compatible with the public welfare." This is a worthy objective.

It would be presumptuous of me to set myself up as an expert on military and technological planning. Even my service on the Government Operations Committee and the National Policy Machinery Subcommittee does not give me the authority to lecture you on the difficulties of coordinating the scientific and military aspects of our defense planning effort.

What I can do, as one versed in public policy, is to offer you an approach to the problem of coordinating and integrating specialized disciplines, which are increasingly interlarded on a policymaking level, which in turn, is the domain of non-specialists.

There are three ways in which we may approach the problem: structure, personnel, and public response.

The first question is that of structure. Do we need to set up special committees or to overhaul our Government in order to get the job done as it should be done?

Whenever freemen encounter a problem they form a committee or an association. This town is filled with committees, associations, organizations, societies, and study groups, in and out of government. Their rise and fall can be plotted and predicted according to the ebb and flow of crises in every field of human endeavor from aeronautical technology to the sociology of Afghanistan.

Such combinations of interested parties are inevitable. In a free society they are desirable. But in government the temptation to form a committee whenever an apparently new problem arises should be treated with great caution and restraint.

As Senator Jackson said in his final statement on the deliberation of the National Policy Machinery Subcommittee:

"Properly managed, and chaired by officials with responsibility for decision and action, committees can be useful in helping make sure that voices that should be heard are heard. But a very high percentage of committees exact a heavy toll by diluting the authority of individual executives, obscuring responsibility for getting things done, and generally slowing decisionmaking."

Government by committee is no government at all, since it is the antithesis of the action on which forceful and effective government depends.

The other temptation in dealing with changing problems of a democracy in our present age is to engage in radical overhauling of the actual framework and structure of government.

The National Policy Machinery Subcommittee received many suggestions for governmental reorganization, ranging from the constitution of a supercabinet with a First Secretary to the proposed establishment of a Department of Science and Technology. The subcommittee rejected both suggestions, noting that "faulty machinery is rarely the real culprit when our policies are inconsistent or when they lack sustained forward momentum. The underlying cause is normally found elsewhere. It consists in the absence of a clear sense of direction and coherence of policy at the top of the Government." Organization is no substitute for leadership.

The subcommittee rejected the concept of a supercabinet and a First Secretary because, in its opinion, the results of such a reorganization would be to hamper the President in the exercise of his responsibilities. In addition, it would tend to cut him off from his principal policymakers and departmental advisers through the imposition of a new bureaucratic organization on one which in many respects is already swollen.

The plight of the National Security Council, as revealed in the subcommittee study, is instructive. The Council was established originally in 1947 to advise the President "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."

Over the years, the Council developed a dual role, that of the Council itself acting as adviser to the President, and that of the Council system in which the Council staff and a complex interdepartmental committee substructure were designed to undergird the works of the Council. The Council system had become, in other words, an institution, another facet of bureaucracy.

The Interdependence of Political, Scientific and Military Planning

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. HENRY M. JACKSON

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, March 21, 1962

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I believe a recent speech by Senator MUSKIE entitled "The Interdependence of Political, Scientific, and Military Planning," should be given further circulation. The Senator has commented on a number of the critical issues in the staffing and organization of the national security policy process following on his work as a member of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Government Operations Committee. This speech was delivered to a meeting of the Electronics Industries Association seminar on March 13, 1962. I hope that Members of Congress will read Senator MUSKIE's most helpful statement.

I ask unanimous consent to have the speech printed in the Appendix of the Record.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF POLITICAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND MILITARY PLANNING

(Remarks by U.S. Senator Edmund S. MUSKIE, Democrat, of Maine, to a luncheon meeting of the Electronics Industries Association seminar on the New Look in Defense Planning, Statler-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1962)

Two weeks ago, President Kennedy spoke to the Nation on his decision to resume nuclear weapons testing. No single issue, and no single decision illustrates more clearly the dilemmas confronting the President and his policy advisers in coordinating political, scientific, and military planning. In retrospect the decision appears to have been inevitable. But in the preparation for that decision, nothing could be treated as inevitable except the paramount importance of the security of the free world.

The remarkable feature of that decision was the balance it achieved in giving proper weight to the three factors involved in our overall national security—domestic and for-